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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes some considerations on the relations between "subject," "language" and 
"world" in the perspective of the overcoming of the traditional opposition between "inner" 
and "outer." I will deal preliminarily with the renewed topicality of the problem of 
psychologism in the light of the neurosciences, touching on the theme of Being-in in Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976), a philosopher who valorized the practical and pragmatic dimension 
of the phenomenological tradition. After that, I will make use of some topological 
properties of the Möbius strip and of the psychoanalytic investigation of language to 
illustrate the structure of subjectivity proposed by Jacques Lacan (1901-1981). 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
Language is a tangle of subject and world that philosophy strives to unravel 
by seeking to attribute different meanings to the terms in play. Reflection on 
the pragmatic basis of semantics can be understood, within our metaphor, as 
one of the ways offered by contemporaneity to tackle this problematic weave. 
This paper proposes some considerations on the relations between 
"subject," "language" and "world" in the perspective of the overcoming of the 
traditional opposition between "inner" and "outer." I will deal preliminarily 
with the renewed topicality of the problem of psychologism in the light of the 
neurosciences, touching on the theme of Being-in in Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976), a philosopher who valorized the practical and pragmatic dimension of 
the phenomenological tradition.1 After that, I will make use of some 
topological properties of the Möbius strip and of the psychoanalytic 
investigation of language to illustrate the structure of subjectivity proposed 
by Jacques Lacan (1901-1981). 
The - obviously unequal - challenge is that of not limiting ourselves to 
defining in the negative a model of nonpsychologistic subjectivity but rather 
of providing some indications on a different form of such subjectivity. The 
outcome is the Lacanian "extimate" ("extimacy," exteriority and intimacy 
                                          
1 See Costa (2003), pp. 209-234. 
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"combined") that, crossing over the opposition between inner and outer, 
subject and world, permits us, also, to rethink the connection between 
semantics and pragmatics. 
 
1. A definition of psychologism 
 
In the lemmata of philosophical vocabularies we find numerous definitions of 
psychologism, described as a philosophical perspective that, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, interpreted logical thoughts and 
principles as "psychic events of our mind."2 This perspective lives again today 
in some significant aspects of the philosophy of mind and of reflection on the 
neurosciences that cast doubt on the autonomy and utility of philosophical 
reflection with respect to scientific research. On another occasion I attempted 
to show the affinity of this type of position with the reductionist and, in 
particular, the logical positivist traditions.3 What we have here is the updating 
of a classical strategy that transforms experience into a "cast of objective 
reality," aiming to flatten the res cogitans on the res extensa.4 
In the attempt to circumscribe psychologism theoretically I have been 
aided by some indications offered by the mathematician and phenomenologist 
Gian-Carlo Rota, who maintained that “one of the common forms of 
reductionism was 'psychologism' - that is, saying everything was explained by 
the workings of the brain […] emotions, religious feelings, poetry, 
mathematics are all workings of the brain, and if we just figure out how 
neurons are put together, then we will explain it all. If we want to reduce 
poetry to the workings of the brain, that is fine.  But first, we must 
understand what poetry is. If we do not understand what poetry is, we will not 
recognize it in the brain.”5 
On this basis I propose, in a provisional and partial form, to define 
psychologism in terms of a relation of inclusion in virtue of which thoughts are 
interpreted as the content whose container is the brain.6 In these terms, the 
brain is the place to which meaning is either connected or reduced, according 
to one's philosophical taste. 
I would like to attempt to rethink the problem of place in order to see, in a 
different perspective, one of the greatest problems of antipsychologism, 
represented by the necessity of articulating two rifts of reality that, at various 
                                          
2 Costa (2003), p. 9. See Flew (1979), p. 292 and Abbagnano (1960), pp. 713-714. 
3 Palombi (2007). 
4 Costa, Franzini, Spinicci (2002), p. 12. 
5 Rota (1991), p. 119, my italics. See Palombi (2009), pp. 250-252. 
6 I deliberately neglect the introspectionistic and conscientialistic meanings of the term 
that, in this historical phase, are held in lower esteem than the reductionist ones. 
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times, we express in terms of the difference between res cogitans and res 
extensa, meaning and facticity, signified and signifier. I propose to think of 
meaning not in terms of content7 without altogether renouncing useful 
spatiality, from the Platonic hierarchy beyond the heavens to the Freudian 
topics, to indicate logical relations. 
 
 
2. The problem of Being-in 
 
We proceed, following Heidegger, to highlight the "necessity of accounting for 
the unitary moment that precedes the diffraction between inner and outer, 
psychic and real" traced, as is well known, in the structure of Being-in-the-
world.8 This is a reformulation of the phenomenological discourse that 
represents the difference (and the disagreement) between Husserl and 
Heidegger that was further re-elaborated by Lacan, as we shall see shortly. 
Lacan is thinking of the analysis of Being-in in which Heidegger criticizes the 
reduction of the relation between Dasein and World to that of the “Being-
present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) "in" an 
entity which is present-at-hand.”9 
In sections 12 and 13 of Being and Time Heidegger demonstrates the 
inadequacy of the traditional opposition between inner and outer that reduces 
inhood [Inheit] to the "kind of being which an entity has when it is 'in' another 
one" on the basis of the celebrated example of the water in the glass or the 
garment in the cupboard.10 This is a fundamental theoretical crux from which 
stem the problems of truth and of language, understood as general modalities 
of the relation between words and things. 
 
 
3. The Möbius strip 
 
Psychoanalysis arises on the paradoxical ridge of the hysterical etiology where 
somatic causes and psychical reasons merge. The difficult face-off between 
inner and outer, between inside and outside,11 proceeds in the construction of 
                                          
7 See Cimatti (2004), pp. 78-116, 176-199. 
8 Costa, Franzini, Spinicci (2002), pp. 270-273; see Heidegger (1927), pp. 78-90. [Page 
numbers in the notes refer to the English translation when cited.] 
9 Heidegger (1927), p. 79, my italics. 
10 Heidegger (1927), p. 79. Rota, too, takes up this phenomenological analysis to criticize 
the limits of a set-theory interpretation of reality; see Palombi (2003), pp. 72-73. 
11 See Freud and the Scene of Writing  in Derrida (1967), pp. 246-291. 
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its topographical architecture, which "may be expressed in spatial terms, 
without reference [...] to the actual anatomy of the brain."12 
Lacan represents a connecting link between our initial phenomenological 
and current psychoanalytic considerations. Based on cues from the Freudian 
texts he develops that which, at least to my eyes, is a sort of modelization of 
Heideggerian Being-in-the-world. The criticism of Lacan's confused eclecticism 
is well known: his mixing of mathematics and art history, psychoanalysis and 
linguistics, psychiatry and surrealism. On this occasion I would like to focus 
on one aspect of this mixture that regards topology, and in particular one of 
its most celebrated surfaces, represented by the Möbius strip.13 
Some of the speculations Lacan devotes to this figure are proposed in his 
ninth and tenth seminars, dedicated, respectively, to identification14 and to 
anguish.15 The strip takes its name from the mathematician August Ferdinand 
Möbius (1790-1860) who, together with Johann Listing (1806-1882), was the 
first to study nonorientable topological surfaces.16 This object which, unlike 
the usual surfaces, possesses only one face, can easily be produced by twisting 
one of the short sides of a rectangle through 180 degrees and then attaching it 
to the opposite side. The resulting figure possesses but a single face; in fact, we 
can paint it entirely without ever lifting our brush from the surface.17 
To comprehend the importance of this characteristic let us recall that 
normal surfaces, with which we are used to dealing, possess two faces and have 
the following property: there is no route from one face to the other that does 
not cross a sort of border called "edge." 
This is the case with the sphere, torus and cylinder, for which it is possible 
to define an inner and an outer face - which is extremely important for our 
purposes. The surface studied by Möbius is a completely different case, since 
after having covered it completely we find ourselves in a position opposite to 
the starting point.18 It is immersed in a space without dividing it into two 
regions, without becoming a border between inner and outer. 
                                          
12 Freud (1925), p. 35. 
13 An analogous perspective is presented in Cimatti (2007), connecting psychoanalysis with 
the philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
14 Lacan (1961-1962). 
15 Lacan (2004). 
16 Without going into the mathematical details, and only for the purposes that concern us 
here, we define the property of orientability by means of a perpendicular to the surface 
having a definite sense (direction). If there exists a route along the surface that brings the 
perpendicular back to the same point, but with its direction (sense) reversed, then the 
surface is not orientable. In this regard see Kline (1972), vol. II, sec. 50.3. 
17 Kline (1972), vol. II, sec. 50.3. 
18 This phenomenon is indicated by the reversal of the sense of the perpendicular. 
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Lacan exploits these properties of the Möbius strip to develop that which 
appears to me to be a modelization of the inhood Heidegger defines in Being 
and Time, in negative terms, emphasizing its difference from the examples of 
the garment and of the water. The relation of continuity that exists in 
Heidegger between Dasein and World is indicated by the term "extimate," a 
Lacanian neologism, which denotes the structure of subjectivity characterized 
by an "intimate exteriority."19 
The Möbius strip is applied, moreover, to another correlated relation, it too 
irreducible to the opposition between inner and outer, which subsists between 
words and things. In fact, Lacan's celebrated thesis that "the unconscious is 
structured as a language"20 possesses interesting topological consequences. To 
comprehend its significance let us recall Saussure's famous comparison that 
assimilates language to a sheet of paper: on the front there is thought, and on 
the back, sound.21 This metaphor is developed thinking of the rectangular 
figure that, from the topological viewpoint, is a surface that separates the 
signified and the signifier by means of an edge. Lacan applies to Saussure's 
sheet of paper a 180-degree torsion that transforms it into the Möbius strip22 to 
show how the relation between things and words, crossing over the adaequatio, 
takes on the form of the Freudian "rebus," interpretative paradigm of slips23 
and of dreams.24  
We need to remember that, in the context of studies on the linguistics of  
de Saussure,  this idea as been developed by Lo Piparo, who uses the Möbius  
strip25 to show that “in the verbal language there is no discontinuity between 
signified and signifier […]: the twofold face of the verbal sign is nothing more 
than a didactic fiction which […] from a theoretical point of view can show to 
be misleading.”26  
                                          
19 Lacan (1986), p. 177 [French edition]. 
20 Lacan (1969), p. 163. This is a concept that was examined a number of times in Lacan's 
texts but that, in this interview, is proposed in terms that are particularly clear and useful 
for our purposes. In fact Lacan continues: "this is not an analogy, I really want to say that 
its structure is that of language [...]. Before the new linguistics was born, Freud had already 
invented it. You asked about what distinguishes me from Freud: well, the answer is right 
here, in the fact that I know linguistics [...]. I can say this because linguistics arose a few 
years after psychoanalysis. Saussure began it shortly after Freud, in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, had written a full-fledged treatise of linguistics. This is my 'distance' from Freud" 
(Lacan, 1969, pp. 163-164). 
21 de Saussure (1972), p. 157 
22 See Chemama, Vandermersch (1998), s.v. “topology”.  
23 Freud (1901), p. 14. 
24 Lacan (1966), p. 260 [French edition]. Lacan cites Freud (1899). 
25 Lo Piparo (1991), pp. 219-220. 
26 Id., p. 217. 
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The property of this topological figure possessing a single face, allows the 
Italian scholar to shed an interesting light on inseparability and unity of the 
linguistic entity as theorized by de Saussure.27 
Within the range of our psychoanalytical interests we must underline that, 
for Freud, the dream is an "original writing" in which "words have the same 
valence as things and vice versa."28 Mixture is the rule of composition of the 
unconscious that escapes the opposition between words and things, which 
retraces, from some points of view, the opposition between inner and outer. 
 
 
4. The torsion of the subject 
 
My idea consists in thinking of the structure of the Lacanian subject as a 
generative torsion that transforms us into a Möbius strip. Playing on the 
double sense - objective and subjective - of the genitive, we could speak of the 
subject as torsion. Our subjectivity is only secondarily, and derivatively, the 
intimacy of a thinking that is opposed to the exteriority of the world. The 
primordial movement, constitutively lost, that generates, together, 
consciousness and the unconscious29 is a torsion in virtue of which we are 
neither inside nor outside any longer. 
But where, then, are we? This is a question that belongs both to the 
structure and to the genesis of the subject. We could answer that we are 
always elsewhere because no absolute border between inner and outer exists, 
and thus has to be continually redefined. In this regard we are given another 
interesting indication by the Möbius strip, which locally conserves the 
opposition between above and below (and thus in some way between internal 
and external), but, globally, the opposition proves derived with respect to the 
connection. 
There is no identity but only a process of identification that accompanies 
us throughout our existence, obliging us to reflect and to redefine, in every 
single point, that which belongs to us and that which is extraneous. It is not 
fortuitous that precisely in the seminar dedicated to identification Lacan 
reflects on topology. We are a phenomenon that is Heideggerianly unitary but 
Lacanianly always and still to be constituted. I would like to conclude by 
attempting, in the light of what I have briefly sketched, to reinterpret some 
typical situations that lead us, for example, to perceive stimuli but to see 
injustices. 
                                          
27 Id., p. 218. 
28 D'Alessandro (1980), p. 175. 
29 This perspective also accounts for the weave of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. 
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How is it possible that in the simple muscular contraction of the face of a 
man at work, in the tension of his muscles or, worse still, in his neuronal hum, 
we can see exploitation? The question is badly put insofar as it presupposes, 
psychologistically, the problem of the reconstruction of a concept interpreted 
as abstract and internal on the basis of perceptive stimuli and physical bodies 
thought of as concrete and external. This is not the phenomenological or even 
the psychoanalytic sense of experience, this is not a realist attitude insofar as 
the form of subjectivity cannot be reduced to such oppositions. 
From this perspective the realism of the "neurophilosophies" appears less 
convincing and, in any case, my preference goes to the Lacanian surrealism 
that fuses things and words, waking and sleeping. Our experience is a 
continual association of abstract and concrete elements, of values and stimuli, 
of emotions and objectivity. And, to put it bluntly, notions such as neurons, 
nervous system, brain "have not come from nowhere, but have been 
constituted on the basis of our experience."30 On the one hand, they 
legitimately aspire to explain how our thinking functions; on the other, they 
possess a historical constitution that epistemology and phenomenology 
investigate in their stratifications. They are, on one hand, things, but on the 
other, words. 
They possess a historical nature that has set them, après-coup, 
retroactively in experience itself and now there they are together with values 
with "a giddy air of always-having-been-around-ness."31 Phenomenology 
investigates stratifications of meaning and their constitution but 
psychoanalytic surrealism confirms that it, often, takes the form of 
juxtaposition. 
The stars, on the vault of heaven, appear close to one another but in 
reality this is by no means the case; and yet this perspective flattening 
represents the condition of possibility of charting the constellations and the 
signs of the zodiac. The latter, while unmasked by astronomers, still have their 
place in newspapers and on television to remind us of our history. That which 
takes place in a court of law presents the same perspective flattening. In the 
pronouncing of a sentence causes and reasons, facts and emotions all 
contribute, perspectively flattening on the legal plane things and ideals, 
jealousies and economic interests, explanation and comprehension. 
Let us describe a hypothetical laboratory interior in which we find a 
neuroscientist who is observing himself; we do not know whether this thought 
experiment can be performed at present, but it does not seem excessively 
                                          
30 Costa, Franzini, Spinicci (2002), p. 317. 
31 Rota (1973), p. 249. For Heidegger "there are coverings-up which are accidental; there are 
also some which are necessary, grounded in what the thing discovered consists in" 
(Heidegger, 1927, p. 60). 
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science-fictional. In the room we find a computer screen on which the scientist 
is examining the visualization of his own cerebral areas produced by means of 
PET or NMR32 techniques that phenomenologically constitute, in this 
imaginary situation, the neuroscientist's intentional focus. The screen is set on 
a table, next to it a photograph holder frames a family photo, hanging on the 
walls we see diplomas and perhaps the poster of a football team. His gaze is 
focused on the digital images but then the phone rings, the scientist gives a 
start and shifts his eyes towards the photo. 
What has happened? Should we say that the focusing of his gaze has 
shifted from the presumed interior of his brain to the perceptive exterior 
because of the phone call? That a material cause has produced a shift from the 
concreteness of physical data to the abstraction of affects? That these affects, 
in their turn epiphenomena of the scientist's neurons, have been activated to 
evoke the memory of a loved one? 
I consider all these to be misunderstandings, caused by the 
"neurophilosophical" confusion between experiment and experience that calls 
the quantitative representation of a laboratory phenomenon empirical fact, 
forgetting, moreover, that such a representation presupposes the 
mathematical dimension, which, indeed, is not empirical.33 Let us dwell on this 
aspect to recall that, in its turn, mathematics ought to be in the cerebral areas, 
leading to the paradox in which the brain is contained in itself. 
Such argumentation reproduces the paradoxical structure of Putnam's 
celebrated argument of the brain in the tub, in which the term "tub" has two 
meanings: the first indicates the container of the brain; the second, everyday 
experience, the phenomenon that as such is contained in the brain.34 
These considerations seek to exemplify the inadequacy of the 
interpretation of the relation between the inner and the outer of subjectivity 
in terms of opposition and to repropose the necessity of a connection between 
them, of which the Möbius strip represents a model. The scientist, or more 
often the philosopher, claims to separate something that is inextricably 
united, which perspectively produces the juxtaposition of different ontological 
regions. For this reason we need to distance ourselves also from 
psychoanalytically-oriented positions claiming that psychoanalysis and 
neurosciences have no points of intersection.35 Between them neither 
                                          
32 PET (Positron Emission Tomography) and NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance). 
33 The - philosophical and nonscientific - attempt to reconstruct the totality of experience 
on the basis of neuronal activations bears great resemblances with the phenomenistically- 
or physicalistically-oriented attempts of the logical positivists, and we can expect it to come 
up against very similar difficulties; see Palombi (2007). 
34 See Chiodo (2007), p. 41. 
35 Laurent (2005), p. 9. 
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integration nor reduction is possible, but rather a collation that makes it 
explicit how they are different perspectives of an investigation of reality that 
is, in any event, unitary in the Lacanian form of the surrealist collage. 
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